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Abstract:  One  of  the  most  pressing  questions  concerning  singular  demonstrative  mental 
contents is  what makes their  content  singular:  that  is  to say,  what makes it  the case that 
individual  objects  are  the  representata  of  these  mental  states.  Many  philosophers  have 
required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the 
possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy 
proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual 
processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking 
into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological 
capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them 
to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of 
perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling short of 
more sophisticated intellectual abilities. 
I – Introduction 
When we perceive an object in front of us we are normally in a position to 
make a demonstrative reference to that object. Some philosophers have argued this is 
!2
the most fundamental form of reference there is, upon which all other reference rests 
(Strawson 1959). Others have assigned demonstrative reference a foundational role in 
language learning and the acquisition of empirical knowledge (Burge 1977, Brewer 
1999).
But regardless of the undeniable importance of demonstrative reference, these 
are not the main questions that shall concern us in this paper. Rather, we wish to take 
the  focus  away from demonstrative  reference  per  se  and  examine  the  underlying 
mental  states  that  support  particular  acts  of  reference  –  states  that  we  shall  call 
‘singular demonstrative mental states’, in order to capture two important elements of 
their  contents:  the  first,  singular  element,  concerns  the  question  of  what  kind  of 
entities are represented in the content of these mental states. To mark the content as 
‘singular’ is to say that individual objects are the representata of these mental states, 
rather than properties, events, etc. These objects are the main subject matter of the 
content.
 The second, demonstrative element, concerns the metasemantic question of 
how the content is determined. To mark the content as ‘demonstrative’ is to say that 
the intentional object of the content is determined through a contextual, perceptual 
relation to things in the subject’s external environment.
Classifying these mental states in this manner allows us to distinguish them, on 
the one hand, from singular contents that are not demonstrative (like the content of a 
thought about an individual that is not perceptually present), and on the other hand, 
from demonstrative contents that are not singular (like the content of a thought about 
a perceptually presented type of color). This allows us to demarcate very precisely our 
object of study, at the same time that it renders explicit two important questions about 
these mental states that we should be able to explain:
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• The demonstrative question: what makes the contents of these mental 
states  ‘demonstrative’,  i.e.,  contextually  connected  to  things  in  the 
external world?
• The  singular  question:  what  makes  these  contents  singular,  i.e., 
contents  that  represent  individual  objects  as  opposed  to  properties, 
events or some other suitable candidate for the representata of these 
mental states?
In this paper we will be mostly concerned with the second, singular question, 
although we will also touch on the demonstrative question. We will propose a way of 
answering the singular question that stands in a middle ground between two popular 
positions among theories on singular content: on the one hand, from philosophers who 
seek to account for this question on the basis of empirical models of visual processing 
borrowed from cognitive  science,  and  on  the  other  hand,  from philosophers  who 
postulate more intellectually sophisticated psychological abilities in order for singular 
content to be possible. Although the range of such abilities is undoubtedly wide, we 
will  focus  here  on  abilities  that  evolve  around  the  possession  of  an  elaborate 
conception of space and time, as required by Evans (1982), Quine (1995) and Hatfield 
(2009).  For ease of exposition,  we shall  call  them perceptualist  and intellectualist 
theories respectively.  
We believe both sides make good points that should be taken into account, and 
we offer a novel way of looking into singular mental content which attempts to do 
justice to both insights. We agree with perceptualist theories that we should be able to 
elucidate the notion of singular content at a more basic level of cognition, without 
requiring too many intellectual capacities on the part of the subject. Moreover, we 
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also  agree  that  philosophical  analysis  should  be  informed  by  the  best  and  most 
advanced cognitive science, and therefore that theories of singular content should go 
hand in hand with empirical theories of object representation in perception. 
However, we also agree with intellectualism that when we come up with a 
theory of singular content, we want more than to know how visual systems are able to 
single out and keep track of discrete perceptual units in a visual array. We are also 
interested  in  the  subject’s  psychological  capacities  to  apprehend  her  external 
environment as structured into particular objects. And particular objects are more than 
discrete clusters of properties that our visual systems are sensitive to; they are also 
unique  entities  that  persist  in  a  time  that  transcends  the  subject’s  perceptual 
interactions  with  the  object,  and  that  move  through  a  space  that  extrapolates  the 
subject’s visual field. And low-level visual processes posited by perceptualism tell us 
little  about  these psychological  capacities.  In this  sense,  to mark the content  of  a 
mental state as singular is to ascribe the subject a psychological capacity to apprehend 
her external environment as structured in this manner. 
In  this  paper  we propose  a  novel  way of  looking at  the  role  of  cognitive 
science in helping us account for singular demonstrative thought. In order to do so we 
will draw attention to a different body of empirical research, one that’s been largely 
ignored by perceptualist theories of singular content. While perceptualist theories put 
an excessive focus on the perceptual mechanisms underlying visual representations of 
objects, we will suggest that a promising path to elucidate the singular question may 
lie in the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in creating and sustaining more abstract 
object representations in the absence of perceptual input. Empirical research on object 
representations in the PFC can give us a clue about how our capacity to represent the 
continued existence of objects may be extrapolated from the context of perception. As 
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this does not require much else from the subject other than a capacity to interact with 
the object, represent it in a more abstract manner, and sustain that representation in 
mind across perceptual and non-perceptual contexts,  it  allows us to illuminate the 
singular question in a less intellectualist terms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II will present two prominent 
contemporary perceptualist  theory:  John Campbell’s  attentional  model  (2002),  and 
Joseph Levine’s non-attentional model (2010). These theories are quite well known in 
the literature on singular  content  and provide excellent  examples of  what  we call 
perceptualism,  hence  our  focus  on  them.  Section  III  articulates  the  intellectualist 
challenge to this type of theory, and sketches some proposals of how to elucidate the 
singular question within a more intellectualistic framework. 
In  section  IV  we  examine  two  other  intermediate  level  theories  between 
perceptualism  and  intellectualism,  namely,  Imogen  Dickie’s  and  José  Luiz 
Bermudez’s, in comparison to our own account. Finally, in section V we will propose 
our  own  intermediate  theory  of  singular  demonstrative  content.  In  our  picture  a 
subject may move beyond sensory representation of objects towards a more complex 
understanding  of  the  spatiotemporal  behavior  of  objects  based  on  psychological 
capacities to sustain an object representation in mind while detached from the context 
of perception. These capacities are supported by abstract representations formed in the 
prefrontal cortex.  
On this  basis,  we become able to represent  the continued existence of  the 
object beyond our perceptual interaction with it, thus giving substance to the idea that 
a subject in this situation is starting to grasp her external environment as structured 
into individual objects.  
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II – Perceptualist theories of singular content
The basic  presupposition behind the perceptualist  strategy is  that  there are 
natural perceptual processes and mechanisms that function to single out objects in the 
world, independently of concepts or descriptive material in the mind of the subject. 
The existence of these mechanisms is supported by empirical evidence from cognitive 
science. They are responsible for establishing a certain relation R between the subject 
and objects in the world, a relation that is supposed to fill two theoretical roles:
1. It provides the point of contact between the mind and the external world
2. It  explains  how individual  objects  are  represented in  the  content  of  visual 
perceptual states
Both  of  these  points  seek  to  elucidate  the  demonstrative  and  the  singular 
questions respectively. For once we have explained, on the basis of R, why individual 
objects are the representata  of  visual  perceptual  states caused by the workings of 
these mechanisms,  we can then say that  mental  states  based on the perception of 
objects  – like the demonstrative mental  states we’re analyzing – will  ‘inherit’ the 
singular  content  of  perception,  and  come  to  represent  the  very  same  objects 
represented in the content of the underlying perceptual states.  1
In this picture it  is R  what gives demonstrative mental states their singular 
content; singularity comes from below, so to speak, from the more primitive level of 
perception. The resulting picture would look something like this:
The notion of ‘inheritance’ may be understood in Burge’s sense, when he talks of demonstrative 1
applications in thought or language – like singling out an object with the demonstrative ‘that one’ – 
“inheriting”,  or  “taking  over”,  the  referents  of  their  counterpart  perceptual  applications.  These 
perceptual  applications  are,  precisely,  the  processes  and  mechanisms  responsible  for  forming 
perceptual representations of objects in the visual system (see Burge 2010: 546).
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Fig.1 
John  Campbell  was  one  of  the  first  philosophers  to  systematically  combine 
empirical models of perceptual processing with a philosophical account of perceptual 
demonstratives. According to Campbell, the perceptual relation that puts us in contact 
with external objects is an attentional relation, which fills two explanatory roles: it 
explains how objects are selected and processes by the visual system, and it enables 
us to perceive the object as ‘experientially highlighted’ (2002). 
The first theoretical role is elucidated through Treisman & Gelade’s Feature 
Integration Theory (FIT), a model of perceptual processing where attention serves as 
the  glue  that  binds  various  features  together,  enabling  a  perceiver  to  consciously 
experience these features as features of a single bounded object.  In the FIT model, 2
simple visual features like color or orientation are first represented pre-attentively and 
in  parallel  in  modular  processing  streams  called  feature  maps.  Conscious  spatial 
attention comes in as the process responsible for binding together features detected in 
separate feature maps to one and the same object, which is none other than the object 
that occupies the attended location. 
 See Treisman & Gelade 19802
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As to the second explanatory role, Campbell argues that it is only in virtue of 
being in perceptual states with the phenomenal property of experiential highlighting 
that a subject is able to have singular demonstrative thoughts about external objects. 
This notion is first introduced in terms of the metaphor of “highlighting a portion of 
the visual field with a yellow marker” (Campbell 2002: 4), which seeks to capture the 
distinctive phenomenology of conscious visual attention. When a subject is presented 
with objects x and y but consciously attends to x, this act of conscious attention brings 
x  into  focus,  at  the  same  time  that  y  is  assigned  to  the  background;  x  is  then 
“highlighted” in her conscious experience of the scene, to the detriment of y. But if 
the subject then consciously shifts her attention to y, the reverse occurs, and y will be 
highlighted in her experience to the detriment of x. 
Both of these elements are required for singular demonstrative thought to be 
possible,  and both  are  explained through conscious  attention.  First  of  all,  if  your 
perceptual system has managed to process visual information about an object but you 
do not perceive this object as experientially highlighted, you will not be in a position 
to  have  singular  demonstrative  thoughts  about  it.  To  illustrate  with  an  example, 
imagine you are  on top of  a  mountain gazing distractedly at  the forest  landscape 
below. You are perceiving a lot of trees, but you do not zoom upon any one tree in 
particular. Your experience remains, as it were, as of ‘a sea of trees’. Although your 
visual system has nonetheless processed visual information about the trees, you are 
not in a position to think ‘that one’ of one of the trees in particular.  
The situation changes when you consciously attend to  a  particular  tree,  and 
come to perceive it as experientially highlighted. When you think about ‘that tree’, 
this is the tree you are referring to: the one that is experientially highlighted in your 
experience, caused by your consciously attending to it. At the subpersonal level this 
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attentional act sets perceptual mechanisms in motion that will bind features found at 
the attended location to one and the same object, and at the personal level you will 
perceive the tree as experientially highlighted. When both of these conditions are in 
place, you are in a position to have a demonstrative thought about the tree. The tree 
you are thinking about is none other than the tree that is experientially highlighted in 
your experience, and whose features your perceptual system has bound together as 
features of one and the same object. 
There are, however, some problems with Campbell’s account. Regarding the 
second explanatory role of conscious attention, Wayne Wu (2011) has argued that the 
phenomenal property of experiential highlighting is more plausibly associated with 
some  aspect  of  cognition,  an  element  of  the  phenomenology  of  thinking 
demonstratively about an object.  Hence,  it  cannot be what explains demonstrative 
thought in the first place. Regarding the first explanatory role, there is now evidence 
of pre-attentive perceptual mechanisms of object representation, which speak against 
R being an attentional relation. If this evidence is correct, it seems that once attention 
is brought into the picture objects have already been selected and represented by the 
visual system. 
Joseph  Levine  explores  some  of  this  evidence  in  his  account  of  singular 
demonstrative  thought,  based  on  Zenon  Pylyshyn’s  (and  collaborators’)  well-
established work on visual  indices,  or  FINSTS. In Pylyshyn’s  model  FINST’s are 3
mental particulars in the early vision system that are captured by external objects in a 
purely bottom-up manner, allowing the subject to keep track of up to four objects 
See  Pylyshyn  2001/2007.  FINST’s  stand  for  Fingers  of  INSTantiation,  a  term  designed  to 3
capture Pylyshyn’s imaginative analogy with the superhero “plastic man”, who is able to stick his 
plastic fingers to particular objects and keep them there as the objects move randomly through space 
(Pylyshyn 2007: 14)
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during a period of observation without having to selectively attend to the location of 
every target to be tracked. The most important evidence comes from the Multiple 
Object Tracking (MOT) experimental paradigm, where subjects are able to keep track 
of up to four targets moving randomly across a screen among qualitatively identical 
non-targets. The high success rate of this task of about 85% (Pylyshyn 2007: 36), 
supports the existence of a pre-attentive mechanism of object selection and tracking, 
for subjects in the task cannot consciously attend to each target to be tracked.
Based on this evidence, Levine sketches a perceptual/cognitive architecture 
hierarchically structured in three levels. At the highest level we have demonstrative 
thoughts, whose constituents are mental representations of the form [that x]. These 
representations  are  structured  as  ‘mental  pointers’,  which  point  to  perceptual 
representations  of  objects  that  have  been  previously  selected  by  attentional 
mechanisms (in this case, a perceptual representation of the object x).  But Levine 
takes these attentional mechanisms to operate not on external things directly but on 
pre-attentive  perceptual  representations  of  objects,  which  he  identifies  with 
Pylyshyn’s  FINST’s.  The  function  of  these  attentional  mechanisms  is  to  select  a 
subset of these pre-attentive representations for further cognitive processing. 
FINST’s  are  assigned  to  objects  automatically  and  pre-attentively, 
independently of concepts or descriptive material in the mind of the thinker. It is thus 
a  very  good  candidate  for  elucidating  the  demonstrative  question.  Moreover, 
Pylyshyn’s evolutionary story about how FINST’s get assigned to objects supports the 
claim that FINST’s capture ordinary material objects, since they are the entities with 
the right spatiotemporal properties and causal power to attract FINST’s in the first 
place.  And if  we stick to  Levine’s  three-level  picture  of  perceptual  and cognitive 
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processing,  attentional  processes  operate  directly  on  FINST representations,  thus 
inheriting the singular content of pre-attentive perception.  4
Finally, since mental demonstratives are nothing but internal pointers to these 
attentive perceptual representations, demonstrative mental states will also inherit the 
singular content of attentional perception. In this manner, both the demonstrative and 
the singular question are elucidated by the perceptual relation R,  established when 
FINST’s are automatically captured by objects in the world.
To conclude this section, we have examined two different options of what the 
fundamental  perceptual  relation  R  might  be,  namely,  conscious  attention  and  the 
assignment of visual indices (or FINST's). We have also seen that this relation R is 
taken to fill two theoretical roles, elucidating both the demonstrative and the singular 
questions. But how well do these theories manage to elucidate these two questions? 
Regarding the demonstrative question, we believe both of these theories have 
the resources to answer it in a satisfactory manner. When it comes to this question we 
are more than happy to endorse an appeal to empirical models of visual processing in 
helping us adequately describe it. Which of these options will turn out to be the most 
adequate  will  depend  on  our  best  philosophical  analysis  coupled  with  the  latest 
experimental evidence on how our visual system works, something we can leave open 
for  the  time  being.  As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  it  is  possible  that  one  of  these 
mechanisms,  or  perhaps  a  combination  of  these,  may  be  used  in  an  empirically 
responsible explanation of how our mental states make contact with external objects 
There  is  a  disagreement  between  Pylyshyn  and  Levine  on  whether  FINST’s  qualify  as 4
perceptual representations or not; Levine thinks they do, while Pylyshyn argues they merely point to 
objects in the world without representing them. This debate, however, is largely terminological, and has 
no bearing on the present discussion.
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via visual perception. We will, therefore, remain neutral on which of these perceptual 
mechanisms best characterizes the point of contact between mind and world. 
We are, however, less optimistic about low-level perceptual processes when it 
comes to the singular question. As we will clarify in the next section, there are good 
reasons  to  suppose  that  something  else,  over  and  above  low-level  processes  of 
perceptual tracking, is required for singular content to be possible. This will be the 
main subject matter of section III.
III – The intellectualist challenge to perceptualism
As we have seen in  section II,  there  is  empirical  evidence that  our  visual 
system is able to single out discrete perceptual units in a complex visual array, which 
can then be visually tracked over a period of observation. Nevertheless, we may still 
legitimately ask: what makes it the case that the subject whose mental states we’re 
analyzing represents particular objects in this case, rather than repeatable instances of 
a more general property? We are talking here of a well-known contrast between a 
creature who, when perceptually confronted with a particular apple, is only able to 
recognize that it is once again in a situation where a feature like ‘appleness’ is present 
in its external environment, versus a creature that is able to grasp that it is faced with 
a  particular  apple;  an  apple  that  might  be  numerically  identical  to  an  apple 
encountered  in  earlier  occasions,  and  that  might  be  encountered  and  re-identified 
again in the future.  In the first case, the content of the creature’s representational state 5
would  be  captured  in  terms  of  a  feature-placing  structure  like  ‘appleness’,  or 
 This contrast  was originally drawn by Strawson (1959: 214ff).  See also Bermudez (2003) and 5
Cussins (1992) for informative discussions on the ‘feature-placing’ and the ‘particular-involving’ levels 
of experience.
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‘appleness here again’, while in the second case we would attribute a singular content 
of the form ‘this particular apple’.  
The  problem  in  the  context  of  the  present  discussion  is  that  low-level 
processes of object perception and tracking fails to differentiate between these two 
scenarios, since in both cases the creature’s perceptual system would need to segment 
the visual scene into discrete perceptual units and track their movements in the visual 
field. What is needed, according to intellectualist accounts of singular demonstrative 
content, is a more sophisticated understanding of ‘objecthood’. For it is precisely this 
understanding what  allows us  to  attribute  singular  content  to  the  subject’s  mental 
state,  rather  than  a  feature-placing  content  that  merely  captures  her  capacity  to 
respond to recurrent instances of features. Otherwise we would be merely smuggling 
objects  for  free  into  the  content  of  demonstrative  mental  states  without  warrant 
(Hatfield 2009: 215). 
The point here is that there are important psychological dimensions to singular 
content that perceptualism leaves out. We ascribe singular content in order to mark 
(among other things) certain psychological capacities on the part of the subject. So the 
elements we assign to representational content, as well as the way in which they are 
combined,  should  reflect  the  way  the  subject  grasps  the  structure  of  her  external 
environment. In assigning singular demonstrative content to a subject’s mental state, 
for example, we are ascribing to this subject a capacity to apprehend her external 
environment as structured into individuals (object-situation representation), and not 
just repeatable instances of bounded properties (feature-situation representation): that 
the thing the subject is cognitively engaged with is a unique, persisting individual that 
will continue to exist after the encounter has ceased. But if the subject shows no signs 
of such psychological capacities, the ascription of singular content is explanatorily 
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idle.  The  capacity  to  perceive  spatially  differentiated  spatial  structures  and 
perceptually track them through attention, for example, may be easily captured by a 
content structured in terms of repeatable instances of a more general property like 
“bounded trackable volume”, which captures perceptual capacities of feature binding 
and visual tracking (Hatfield 2009).  
In short, what an answer to the singular question demands is not only how 
visual systems manage to segregate and track volumetric structures in a visual array 
(which  is  a  question  for  empirical  psychology),  but  also  how  we  as  subjects  of 
experience  manage  to  apprehend  our  external  environment  as  structured  into 
individuals, over and above segregated spatial structures instantiating features. Here’s 
where  the  theoretical  notion  of  singular  content,  as  applied  to  mental  states,  is 
particularly useful as a way of marking these capacities. Since perceptualist theories 
can  only  give  us  the  former  set  of  capacities,  they  fail  to  elucidate  the  singular 
question. 
According to W.V.O. Quine, what is needed are linguistic abilities. Quine called 
the process of moving from the experience of a world structured in terms of recurrent 
instances of properties to the experience of a world structured into enduring physical 
objects,  the  ‘reification  of  bodies’.  In  a  series  of  writings  he  described  the 
psychogenesis  of  reification  as  a  process  comprising  several  stages  of  increasing 
cognitive  complexity,  as  the  subject  masters  various  linguistic  structures  like 
predication, quantification, pronominal reference, relative clauses, etc.6
The precise details of Quine’s account need not detain us here; it suffices to 
say that this account has been severely criticized by philosophers and psychologists 
See Quine 1995 (chapter 3) for a useful summary of the various stages of reification.6
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alike, due to it  being overly intellectualistic and heavily language-dependent.  The 7
main  kind of  criticism comes from empirical  evidence  that  point  to  capacities  of 
object  individuation  in  pre-linguistic  humans,  gathered  on  the  basis  of  the 
dishabituation experimental  paradigm (Spelke  et  al.  1995,  Carey & Xu 2001,  Xu 
2007). Since these experiments show psychological abilities of object individuation 
before the emergence of language, it cannot be that subjects need to master a series of 
linguistic apparatus if object individuation is to take place.
There is,  however, a different problem that may be extracted from Quine’s 
writings. This problem can be formulated in a language-independent manner, and is 
thus  not  so  easily  dismissed  by  evidence  from  the  dishabituation  experimental 
paradigm. The problem comes from Quine’s remarks on a stage of reification where 
the body is recognized as identical over time across longer stretches of time, which 
may be seen in the following passage:
“There  is  still  a  momentous  further  step  of  reification,  wherever  it  may  fit  in  the  developmental 
sequence. It is the transcending of the specious present. Up to that point the reification of bodies is still 
sketchy, weak in the time dimension. There is as yet no sense in saying that this raven is the one we 
saw yesterday, or that it is not. We are still dealing with a stage (…) that is limited to the specious 
present and to short-term memories and expectations.” (Quine 1995: 36) 
It  is  at  this  point  that  philosophers usually bring in capacities  to represent 
objects within a more comprehensive, objective spatiotemporal framework. As Quine 
continues:
“The last stage [of reification] is where the body is recognized as identical over time, despite long 
absences and interim modifications. Such reification presupposes an elaborate schematism of space, 
For representative critiques see Campbell (2002), Bermudez (2003), Carey (2009) and Burge 7
(2010).
!16
time, and conjectural hidden careers or trajectories on the part of causally interacting bodies.” (Quine 
1992: 7)
This strategy has been endorsed by P.F. Strawson (1959), Gareth Evans (1982) 
and more recently by Gary Hatfield (2009).  The basic suggestion is that once the 
subject develops a mature and elaborate scheme of space and time, she acquires the 
means to maintain, or recover, the object’s numerical identity diachronically through 
long  periods  of  non-observation.  I  can  tell,  for  example,  that  the  pocket  watch  I 
recently  saw  in  my  grandmother’s  attic  is  the  same  pocket  watch  I  saw  my 
grandfather wearing decades ago because I can trace a plausible spatiotemporal path 
from p (my grandfather’s pocket) at an earlier time t to p’ (my grandmother’s attic) at 
a much later time t’.  The pocket watch’s numerical identity is thus maintained (or 
recovered)  diachronically,  thanks  to  my  capacity  to  speculate  about  its  possible 
movements  and  behaviors  from place  p  and  time  t  to  a  different  place  p’  and  a 
posterior time t’, across all intermediaries times and places in between.
One problem with this solution, however, is that what such a scheme consists 
in is something notoriously difficult to make precise.  John Campbell, for example, 8
has  suggested  that  our  understanding of  the  simultaneous  connectedness  of  space 
must be based on our grasp of the movements of objects throughout this space, which 
of course presuppose a prior grasp of the particularity of objects (1999). Hence, it 
cannot be that we need a conception of space in order to understand the particularity 
of objects; the order of explanation would be reversed. Be as it may, a more detailed 
discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. But on the basis of these 
serious difficulties, if we could come up with an answer to the singular question that 
See Bennett (1996) and the essays collected in Eilan, McCarthy and Brewer (1999).8
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did not require a prior elucidation of an “elaborate schematism of space and time”, 
that would be preferable. 
In the final sections of the paper we will propose a different way of answering 
this question, which will not require our acquisition of a mature and elaborate scheme 
of space and time. Although we agree that possession of such a scheme (whatever it 
may mean) greatly improves our capacity to identity and re-identify objects across 
successive  perceptual  encounters,  we  don’t  believe  this  is  the  only  measure  of  a 
subject’s capacity to apprehend her external environment as structured into particular 
objects.
We will propose another measure, based on a capacity to actively sustain an 
object representation in mind across different contexts. This capacity, supported by 
neural structures in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), allows us to elucidate the singular 
question  in  a  way  that  is  considerably  less  intellectualistic  than  the  suggestions 
sketched in this section. But before we go into details, we will examine two other 
theories  that  were  also  proposed  in  the  literature  as  middle  ground  between 
intellectualism and perceptualism. 
IV – Other intermediate theories of singular demonstrative content 
 To be fair, we are not the only ones to realize that the singular question might 
demand more than low-level perceptual processes of object segregation and tracking, 
but  less  than  what  intellectualism  requires.  Imogen  Dickie  (2010)  and  José-Luiz 
Bermudez  (2003/2007),  for  example,  have  both  proposed  intermediate  theories 
between these two extremes, which will be briefly examined in turn. 
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Although  Dickie  happily  accepts  the  perceptualist  claim  that  low-level 
perceptual processes are able to correctly select objects in a visual array, in order for 
us to be able to single them out in thought other abilities are required. Her motivation 
for postulating these extra set of abilities is to differentiate between actual material 
objects  and  things  like  shadows and  water  ripples.  For  at  the  level  of  the  visual 
system, both are considered as ‘visual objects’,  i.e.,  items that  are segregated and 
processed by the visual system as units. So if at the level of the visual system there is 
no differentiation between material objects and shadows or water ripples, how can we 
refer to objects based on this perceptual capacity alone? 
Her solution is to say that perceptual abilities to single out and track perceptual 
units must be supplemented by a subject’s sensitivity to the possible ways in which 
objects  might  behave,  according  to  their  category  (i.e,  material  object).  In  other 
words, when you attribute a property to some object – say, the property of being solid 
– this attribution is governed by a certain ‘template’ you have of that object, which 
determines  the  kind  of  properties  it  is  possible  for  it  to  have,  appropriate  to  its 
category.  
Templates are dynamic notions that only make sense diachronically, in terms of 
the cluster of dispositions you have concerning the object’s states and doings over 
time. When you attribute the property of solidity to an object of perception, we cannot 
know only on the basis of this single property attribution whether you have managed 
to single out  an object  in  thought  or  not.  For  suppose at  time t  you attribute the 
property  of  solidity  to  it,  but  at  time  t’  the  object  does  something  completely 
unexpected such as vanish out of thin air. When faced with this violation of solidity, 
you should be disposed to withdraw your earlier attribution, in order to maintain the 
coherence and stability your template of material objects. Failure to do so reveals that 
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you have a faulty template, a template that allows for violations of solidity that are not 
possible  for  material  objects.  Hence,  you  do  not  have  a  singular  demonstrative 
thought about it; it is a case of reference failure.  
In a similar vein, Bermudez argues that objects are more than just perceptual 
units that can be segregated and tracked in a visual array by low-level perceptual 
mechanisms. In his ‘object properties model’ (2003/2007), to perceive an object is to 
have a  perceptual  sensitivity  to  what  he calls  ‘canonical  object  properties’.  These 
properties circumscribe what it is for something to count as a physical object, and 
correspond to certain physical principles and regularities that govern the behavior of 
objects.  For example: objects tend to be resistant to pressure, to be subject to the 
effects  to gravity,  to have a certain mass that  govern their  interactions with other 
objects, and so on (2003:82). To each of these regularities, there corresponds a higher-
order property these objects possess: for example, the property of being resistant to 
pressure, of being subject to gravity, etc. Unless one is perceptually sensitive to these 
properties, manifested in certain expectations and anticipations regarding the object’s 
behavior as one actively interacts with it, one would not be able to single it out in 
perception or thought.  
Like  Dickie,  Bermudez  complements  low-level  perceptual  processes  with 
certain aspects of subjects’ dispositions and active interactions with objects in the 
world. In this sense, both may be understood as theories of singular demonstrative 
content that are intermediate between perceptualism and intellectualism. 
We have sympathies for these accounts – specially if  we interpret Dickie as 
proposing  a  less  rationalist  and  more  inclusive  notion  of  property  attribution,  in 
dispositional terms for example – where to attribute the property ‘…is edible’ to an 
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object is nothing more than to attempt to eat it. They allow us to take one step beyond 
standard perceptualist theories that mention only low-level perceptual processes, and 
bring into the picture important elements of subjects’ actions and dispositions towards 
material objects. We believe this is plausible and on the right track, and our account 
should  be  understood  more  as  a  way  of  complementing  these  theories  than  as 
philosophical competitors. 
But because they are still restricted to contexts of perceptual interaction, they 
fail  to  fully  answer  the  intellectualist  challenge,  which  brings  out  the  worry  that 
singular  demonstrative  content  stretches  beyond  the  context  of  perception.  Our 
account allows us to take one step even further, going beyond perception while still 
falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. The details of this account 
will be fleshed out in section V. 
V – Singular demonstrative content and the prefrontal cortex
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a collection of interconnected neocortical areas 
that sends and receives projections from virtually all cortical sensory systems, motor 
systems and subcortical structures (Miller & Cohen 2001). The PFC has been linked 
to  analogical  reasoning,  working  memory,  cognitive  control,  decision-making  and 
problem solving (Speed 2010, O’Reilly & Frank 2006). Kharitonova and Munakata 
have shown for example that perseverance behavior in task-switching (i.e., failure to 
modify  one’s  past  behavior  in  light  of  the  novel  task)  is  linked  to  task-relevant 
information  being  represented  in  posterior  cortical  areas,  which  has  been 
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independently shown to encode information in a more detailed and stimulus-specific 
manner.   9
More flexible switching and adaptation, in contrast, is linked to task-relevant 
information  being  actively  sustained  via  neuronal  firings  in  the  prefrontal  cortex, 
allowing it to be maintained in working memory as one switches flexibly from one 
task to another.  This is because prefrontal representations encode information in a 
more  abstract  format,  collapsing  across  specific  idiosyncratic  details  and  forming 
more abstract superordinate categories, which allow them to be more easily applied 
outside the learning context. 
But what exactly is the role of the prefrontal cortex in creating these more 
abstract superordinate categories? We can make this idea clearer with Nicolas Rougier 
(and collaborators’) work on connectionist models of PFC processing (2005). Their 
hypothesis is that activation of PFC-specific neurobiological mechanisms in a wide 
range of task experiences is sufficient for the PFC to self-organize into more abstract 
representations,  allowing  the  network  to  make  more  successful  generalizations  to 
novel circumstances.
The stimuli presented to the network varied along a number of dimensions 
(shape,  size,  color  and spatial  location),  and the  networks  were  tested in  either  a 
subset or the totality of tasks directed at naming or comparing different features. The 
authors tested networks of varying complexity and under different conditions: with all 
or a subset of the PFC-specific neural mechanisms, and with training in two or all of 
the four possible tasks.
 See  Kharitonova & Munakata 2011, Miller & Desimone 1994, Jog et al. 19999
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Interestingly, what they found is that only the full PFC model, encompassing 
all PFC-specific mechanisms and capacities, developed synaptic weights and patterns 
of  activity  that  encoded  more  abstract  representations  of  dimensions  of  features 
(‘color’, ‘shape’, etc.), which encompass various features within any given dimension 
(Rougier et al. 2005: 7340). These representations aided task performance by being 
actively maintained in the PFC while sending top-down excitatory support for the 
relevant stimulus dimension: for example, if the task at hand was to name a particular 
color,  the more abstract  representation of the ‘color’ dimension would be actively 
maintained  in  the  PFC,  and  would  constantly  send  excitatory  signals  to  sensory 
representations of particular colors for the whole duration of the task. An adaptive 
gating  mechanism,  in  turn,  learned  to  update  PFC activity  whenever  the  relevant 
dimension to the task at hand switched. If the task changes from naming colors to 
naming shapes,  a  more abstract  representation of  the ‘shape’ dimension would be 
actively maintained, and excitatory signals sent to the sensory and posterior cortices. 
Due to the more abstract nature of these representations, we should also expect 
that they would be able to modulate not only processing of familiar stimuli (i.e., those 
in which the network was trained) but also processing of novel stimuli – that is to say, 
we  should  expect  the  full  PFC  network  to  be  able  to  generalize  from  its  prior 
experience to novel situations, which is exactly what was observed. The full  PFC 
network exhibited significant generalization capacities, achieving 85% accuracy on 
stimulus for which it had no prior same-task experience (Rougier et al. 2005: 7341).
In  addition,  significant  generalization  was  observed  only  in  networks  that 
received training in all  the tasks:  those that  trained only in  a  task subset  showed 
reduced generalization capacities, making as much as four times more errors. This 
shows  that  cognitive  flexibility  and  generalization  arise  not  only  from  a  fully 
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operational PFC but also as a function of the range of experiences we have in the 
world. As we actively engage with our external environment in a variety of tasks, we 
bring to the foreground of our experience now one dimension of the environment, 
now another;  on  this  basis,  PFC-specific  neurobiological  mechanisms  are  able  to 
stabilize together certain features of the environment into more abstract superordinate 
dimensions, which endows the cognitive system with greater cognitive flexibility and 
adaptability to novel situations. 
And what we now want to suggest is that ‘object’ is precisely one of these 
categories: an abstract, superordinate PFC representation that emerges as we actively 
interact  with  objects  in  the  world  and  learn  of  their  various  behaviors.  This 
representation  emerges  gradually  in  the  PFC,  as  a  result  of  a  wide  range  of 
experiences with objects in the world combined with PFC-specific neurobiological 
structures. 
We have  briefly  seen  in  section  IV Bermudez’s  ‘object  properties  model’, 
where  objects  are  understood  as  things  that  behave  according  to  certain  physical 
regularities. We agree. As we actively engage with objects in various ways we bring 
some of these properties to the forefront of our experience, depending on the task at 
hand: that objects are subject to the effects of gravity, that they have a certain mass 
which govern their interactions with other objects, etc. And just like the network in 
Rougier’s experiments has learned to extract a more abstract dimension of ‘color’ 
from a series of interactions with particular colors, the more abstract category ‘object’ 
is extracted from repeated patterns of interactions with objects, as we experience their 
difference properties.  For example,  if  one is  engaged in a task that  highlights the 
property of objects of being subject to gravity, and then shifts to a context where the 
property  of  causally  influencing  other  bodies  is  highlighted,  a  more  abstract 
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representation of ‘object’ will be activated in the PFC, sending excitatory signals to 
the posterior and sensory cortices and guiding our active interactions with the object 
in each case.  
The more abstract nature of these representations also allows us to generalize 
from our prior experience to novel encounters, as the PFC representation activates 
whenever  we  are  faced  with  (what  seems  to  behave  like)  an  object.  This 
representation may be actively held in mind even if the object cannot be currently 
perceived,  allowing  us  to  represent  the  continued  existence  of  the  object  across 
perceptual and non-perceptual contexts.
Instances of this capacity have been observed in several delayed matching to 
sample tasks, where subjects need to actively sustain an object representation in mind 
in order to match it to a target object that appears after a certain time, during which 
the object is unperceived (Miller et al.  1996, Warden & Miller 2007). What these 
studies show is that cells in the PFC that represent the target object show heightened 
activity  during  the  delay  period,  which  is  taken to  be  the  neural  correlate  of  the 
capacity to represent the continued existence of the object during longer periods of 
non-observation. 
At the same time that activity in the PFC is enhanced, activity in sensorimotor 
areas that represent more specific surface properties of the object is diminished during 
the delay period (Courtney et al. 1998). Hence the emphasis we put on PFC-specific 
object representations as a way of addressing the singular question, over and above 
sensory representations of objects emphasized by perceptualist theories of singular 
content. During periods in which the object is not currently perceived the sensory 
representation of the target object will weaken or disappears altogether, but the more 
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abstract PFC representation will allow us to represent the object's continued existence 
beyond the context of perception.
These effects, as Rainer and Miller argue, aren't due to attentional modulation 
but  to  what  they  call  'experience-based  modulation';  that  is  to  say,  through  our 
experiences with objects selective strengthening occurs between neurons in the PFC 
and neurons in the visual system that represent the object in question. This allows the 
representation to be actively maintained through heightened activity in the PFC even 
in the absence of perceptual input, for increasingly longer periods of non-observation 
(Rainer & Miller 2000: 186). 
VI. Conclusion
We are now finally in a position to give an adequate answer to what we have 
called  the  'singular  question'  concerning  singular  demonstrative  content.  If  we 
imagine a case where a subject is perceptually confronted with an individual object 
and then goes through a change of context – i.e., the object is removed from sight for 
a certain period of time – the PFC affords her a way to actively maintain the object 
representation in mind until she encounters it again, maintaining its numerical identity 
beyond the context of perception.  10
For example, as we experience a familiar object travel away from us and later 
return, or as we travel away from the object and return at a later time, we can exploit 
Granted, sensory representations of objects may also be said to “move beyond the context of 10
perception”, in the sense that they survive temporary occlusions behind obstacles, and thus can be 
maintained in the absence of actual perceptual input. But in this case the representation is short-lived 
(no more than 8 seconds according to research conducted by Noles et al. 2005) and dependent on 
perceptual expectations concerning the object’s reappearance at the other end of the occluder. But 
current research shows that the more abstract nature of PFC representations allow it to survive  longer 
periods of non-observation in a way that is less dependent on the context of perception.
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our capacity to keep the object’s representation active in the PFC in order to maintain 
the object's  numerical  identity  diachronically.  A child  who has  seen its  Christmas 
present  be  placed  under  the  tree  on  Christmas  Eve  can  actively  maintain  its 
representation in mind throughout the night, as she lies awake anxiously waiting for 
Christmas morning.  When she returns  after  a  sleepless  night  she presumes she is 
faced with the same object left under the tree the previous night, which she kept in 
mind during this interval.
Granted, our capacities for temporal and spatial  representation at  this level 
may not be sufficiently developed to support successive re-identification of the object 
over long stretches of time. But these capacities, we maintain, suffice to distinguish 
individual objects from instances of property-kinds as the representata of our mental 
states.  For  representations  of  the  property-kind  ‘bounded  trackable  volume’ are 
sensory  representations  that  fade  away  shortly  after  the  perceptual  encounter  has 
come to an end. Flexible PFC representations, in contrast, may be actively maintained 
for  longer  periods of  time,  allowing us  to  maintain an object's  numerical  identity 
beyond the context of perception.
Of course, this capacity is fallible, as it is possible for the object to be replaced 
by a qualitatively identical one at some point during periods of non-observation. In 
this case, our re-identification of the object as the same one we have perceived earlier 
(and which we have kept in mind) will turn out to be mistaken. But there’s nothing 
wrong with this scenario: developing further ways to check for sameness of numerical 
identity after a period of interrupted observation is precisely one of the ways in which 
we expect  our knowledge of objects  to develop.  Our ability to draw a distinction 
between numerical and qualitative identity is itself a gradual matter, which develops 
in time as we continue to interact with objects in the world in various ways. There 
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needn’t be a magical point where maintenance of numerical identity across different 
contexts suddenly becomes possible.
To  conclude,  we  have  started  out  with  two  questions,  which  any  putative 
theory of singular demonstrative content must be able to answer:
• The demonstrative question: what makes the contents of these mental 
states ‘demonstrative’, i.e., connected to things in the external world?
• The  singular  question:  what  makes  these  contents  ‘singular’,  i.e., 
contents  that  represents  individual  objects  as  opposed to  properties, 
events or some other suitable candidates for the representata of these 
mental states?
Regarding the first, we have granted that perceptualist theories have adequate 
resources to address the demonstrative question in a satisfactory way. As we know 
more about how our visual system is able to extract and process visual information, 
we will be able to answer the question of how the mind, via visual perception, can 
make contact with external things in the world.
But we have also said that the perceptualist strategy has its limitations when it 
comes to the second,  singular  question.  Individual  objects  are more than spatially 
segregated volumes that may be visually tracked during a period of observation. They 
are also enduring physical things that persist in time, and that continue to exist after 
the perceptual encounter has come to an end. Perceptualist theories, which attempt to 
answer the singular question only on the basis of sensory representations of objects, 
face limitations when confronted with this problem.
One answer to the singular question, which may be found in Quine, Strawson, 
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of space and time, required to speculate about the possible movement and behavior of 
objects during long periods of absence.
We do not doubt that such a conception of space and time does indeed offer a 
solution to the singular question. But we dispute that this is the only possible solution. 
Another  option,  which  is  considerably  less  intellectualistic,  lies  in  a  capacity  to 
actively sustain an object representation in mind through longer stretches of time even 
in  the  absence  of  perceptual  input.  This  capacity  is  supported  by  more  abstract 
representations that are formed in the PFC. These representations emerge gradually 
and naturally as PFC-specific neurobiological structures are exposed to a wide range 
of experiences with objects in the world. 
This capacity allows us to differentiate between individual objects and instances 
of the property-kind 'bounded trackable volume' as the representata of our mental 
states,  without  having  to  appeal  to  more  sophisticated  forms  of  spatiotemporal 
representations.  And when we become able  to  represent  individual  objects  in  this 
manner,  we are then in a position to engage in a series of  object-directed mental 
activities with singular demonstrative contents. The singular element of this content is 
accounted for by our capacity to actively sustain an object representation in mind 
while detached from the context of perception, whose neural correlate is heightened 
activity in cells in the PFC that represent the target object.  
But before we bring our discussion to an end, we must admit that perhaps both 
sides would be unmoved by our account. That is to say, perhaps philosophers of a 
perceptualist inclination will insist that there is no need to go beyond the context of 
perception  (although  there  may  be  good  reasons  to  go  beyond  low-level  sensory 
processes), while intellectualists will protest that this proposal is too weak; that the 
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notion of object persistence that is needed here is even stronger than the one we rely 
on, as entities that may be re-identified over very long stretches of time and across 
different  places.  This  is  something  that  might  indeed  require  more  sophisticated 
spatiotemporal abilities. 
But there is a way of conciliating both worries. As we see it, capacities to single 
our particular objects in thought might come in degrees, and there may be no specific 
set of abilities that demarcate a precise point where singular demonstrative thought 
suddenly  becomes  possible.  We can  then  see  all  the  abilities  that  were  discussed 
throughout the paper as indications that one is getting hold of the capacity to single 
out particular objects, and that one is developing one’s understanding that the world is 
structured into individual things. In this picture, the perceptualist would be correctly 
describing the lower end of this spectrum of abilities, while intellectualists would be 
describing its higher end. Our account, in turn, would be something in between. 
So, to be clear, we are not claiming that singular demonstrative thought is to 
be analyzed exclusively at the level of the representational abilities associated with 
the prefrontal cortex. Our aim is more modest than that. We are rather bringing these 
abilities into the discussion and pleading for their incorporation into the theory of 
singular demonstrative content, while at the same time drawing attention to a body of 
empirical  research  that  has  been  largely  ignored  by  both  perceptualists  and 
intellectualists.  We  believe  this  research  may  provide  us  with  important  insights 
concerning singular demonstrative representation. With this paper, we hope to have 
provided the means to take singular demonstrative thought one step further beyond 
contexts  of  perceptual  interaction,  while  still  falling  short  of  more  sophisticated 
intellectual  abilities.  In  this  sense,  our  account  may  be  of  interest  to  both 
perceptualists and intellectualists alike. 
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